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roviding access to adequate health care services is an important component of empow-
ering people with human capital. This, however, can be achieved only when the spend-
ing on health care is adequate and delivery systems efficient. Ensuring adequate out-
lay on health services and efficient use of allotted expenditure are important not
only to improve the productivity and earning capacity of the population, particularly
the poor, but also their health status. Not surprisingly, improving health indicators is
an important component of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) set by the
United Nations. There are also important targets on health status achievements set
for the Tenth Plan. The Common Minimum Programme of the ruling UPA govern-
ment also seeks to increase the public expenditure by the Centre and States on health
and family welfare schemes from the present level of less than 1% to 2%-3% of the
gross domestic product (GDP).
The provision of health and family welfare services falls in the realm of concurrent
responsibility of the Centre and the States, but the latter have a predominant role in
the delivery of these services. However, fiscal pressures at the State level lead to com-
pression of expenditures by the State Governments resulting in an increase in Cen-
tral financing of these services, particularly for some prioritized programmes imple-
mented through the Centre and Centrally sponsored schemes. Thus, over 85% of the
public expenditure on medical and public health is incurred by the State Governments,
though the proportion of financing the expenditure by the State Governments is lower. 
This paper identifies the resource gap between the desired and the actual health
expenditure in 15 major States in India (14 large, non-special category States and
Assam), and highlights the extent to which the gap can be reduced by augmenting
resources at the State level. Further, it estimates the resource gap that cannot be met
through States’ own resources and therefore, requires Central transfers. The design
of Central transfers needed for meeting the required health expenditure of various
States is also discussed.
The principal motivation for this paper is the concern for achieving the targets set for
improving the health status of India’s population, particularly the poor and the vul-
nerable. While fulfilling the targets for improving the health status set by both national
and international agencies (Tenth Plan and MDGs) requires considerable augmenta-
tion in expenditures, the deteriorating fiscal situation at the State level has imposed
severe constraints in financing them. In particular, there has been a decline in social
sector expenditure as a percentage of both the gross state domestic product (GSDP)
and total expenditure, in a majority of States in the 1990s (Dev and Mooij 2005). The
combined expenditure of States on medical, public health, sanitation, water supply
and family welfare declined from 8.4% of the total expenditure in 1990-91 to 7.2% in
2001-02. As a proportion of the GSDP, the decline was from 1.5% to 1.3% during the
period. In 1998-99, the States contributed more than 85% of the total expenditure on
medical, public health, water and sanitation, and family welfare schemes (Rao 1998). 
In the context of deteriorating finances of the States, the decline in health expendi-
ture is a matter of concern. This is more so because the share of public expenditure in
the GDP in the case of health expenditure is much lower in India for the level of per
capita income. In 2000, the aggregate expenditure of both the Centre and the State
Governments in India was just about 0.9% of the GDP whereas even Bangladesh and
Bhutan, countries with lower per capita GDP, incurred higher health expenditure of
1.4% and 3.7% of the GDP, respectively and advanced countries such as the US and UK
incurred substantially higher expenditure-5.8% and 5.9% of the GDP, respectively. 
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INDIAWith the prevailing level of public expenditure on health
and its declining trend in the 1990s, it appears difficult for India
to achieve the health targets of MDGs and the Tenth Plan objec-
tives. As per the provisional estimates, the infant mortality rate
(IMR) in India stood at 66 in 2001 (Sample Registration Sys-
tem Bulletin 2002), which was much higher than the Tenth
Plan target of 45 by 2007. Similarly, the maternal mortality ratio
(MMR) was much higher than the target. The problem is exac-
erbated by the fact that there are significant variations in the
IMR, MMR and life expectancy at birth (LEB) between differ-
ent States. In fact, health sector outcomes in the poorer States
are extremely low. Similarly, there is considerable catching up
to do in the health status of women, scheduled castes and tribes.
This calls for substantial increases in the resources allocated to
the public provision of health, targeting of health expenditure
to areas and groups of population with low health indicators
and focusing on the delivery of health services to transform
public expenditure into improved outputs and outcomes. 
This study attempts to estimate the expenditure required
between 2005-06 and 2009-10 for meeting specific health
goals and explores the possible means of meeting the expen-
diture requirement in 15 selected States.1 The choice of the
terminal year 2009-10 for estimating expenditure requirement
is driven by the fact that the MDGs have to be met by 2015.
To arrive at the desired outcomes by 2015, appropriate expen-
diture during the period 2005-06 to 2009-10 are crucial. 
Expenditure Requirement for Health and
Related Sectors
Health outcomes are affected not only by direct expenditure
on the health sector but also by expenditure on related sectors
such as safe drinking water, sanitation, nutrition, primary edu-
cation and roads (Shiva Kumar 2005, Deolalikar 2004). Expen-
diture requirement in this analysis is, therefore, viewed as a pack-
age of expenditures required in each of these sectors rather
than the health sector alone.2 Such a package of expenditures
in different sectors mutually reinforce each other and has been
argued to be important in the context of assessing budgetary
allocations for achieving health goals (Shiva Kumar 2005). This
study estimates the input deficiencies in each of these sectors
from the specified national norms/targets in the States and trans-
forms these into the expenditure needs for the respective States. 
Health Sector (Medical, Public Health and Family
Welfare)
Requirements in the health sector are targeted towards pro-
viding a minimum level of access to health care facilities, both
in terms of physical facilities and manpower in the respective
States. In particular, the study focuses on the national norms
related to rural primary health care institutions such as sub-
centres (SCs), primary health centres (PHCs) and community
health centres (CHCs) and estimates the resource requirements
for meeting the national norms related to these institutions.
(As per the national norms, there should be one SC for every
5000 population, 1 PHC for every 30,000 population and 1
CHC for every 120,000 population in the plains. The corre-
sponding figures for tribal/difficult terrains are 3000, 20,000
and 80,000, respectively). While the norms may be inadequate
to achieve the desired outcomes in many States, they aim to
ensure the provision of the minimum level of health infra-
structure in each State. The expenditure requirement for the
health sector during 2005-06 to 2009-10 is given in Table 1.
The need for increased expenditures in the health sector
arises from the fact that the existing infrastructure of SCs,
PHCs and CHCs is grossly inadequate in many States. As per
the Bulletin on Rural Health Statistics (2002), none of the 15
major States under study have achieved the required level of
provision in all the three categories of SCs, PHCs and CHCs.
While some States have achieved the norms in terms of SCs
and PHCs, none of the States have achieved the targets with
respect to CHCs. The number of States meeting the norms in
individual categories reduces as one moves from SCs to PHCs
and CHCs. Even where the norms are met in terms of the num-
ber of facilities required, many of them are non-functional
due to lack of equipment and need for civil works. The mere
meeting of norms in terms of the number of facilities is
therefore not enough. Many of these facilities also suffer from
shortage of manpower. The estimates therefore include the
cost of upgrading the equipment facilities, civil works and
manpower in the existing facilities, apart from setting up new
facilities, to fulfil the national norms. 
The total requirement of expenditure in the health sector
comprises the capital and the revenue components. The cap-
ital component of expenditure requirement further consists
of two parts. The first is the cost of building new facilities for
fulfilling the national norms for SCs, PHCs and CHCs, and
the second is the cost of upgrading the civil works and equip-
ment in the existing SCs, PHCs and CHCs. It is assumed that
this capital expenditure will be carried out in a phased man-
ner over a period of five years between 2005-06 and 2009-
10 to eliminate all gaps in the physical infrastructure by
2010. In addition to the cost of covering up the existing gap,
the estimate of requirements also includes the cost of pro-
viding health care services for the additional population in
each year between 2005-06 and 2009-10.3,4
The revenue expenditure requirement in the health sector
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1 The 15 States are Andhra Pradesh, Assam, Bihar (including Jharkhand), Gujarat, Haryana, Karnataka, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh (including Chhattisgarh), Maharashtra, Orissa, Punjab,
Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh (including Uttaranchal) and West Bengal. 
2 The National Commission on Macroeconomics and Health (NCMH) has identified expenditure on these sectors as important for achieving health goals.
3Information on the existing SCs, PHCs and CHCs is taken from the Bulletin on Rural Health Statistics, which provides the figures updated till 2001-02. Unfortunately, the information on the
addition to infrastructure in the States between 2001-02 and 2005-06 is not easily available. To account for some likely increase in infrastructure between 2001-02 and 2004-05, capital
expenditure on SCs, PHCs and CHCs in individual States, provided in the States' Finance Accounts, along with the unit cost of building these facilities were used. For water supply and
sanitation, a 10% increase in access between 2001-02 and 2004-05 has been assumed.
4 The National Commission on Macroeconomics and Health (NCMH) estimates the unit cost used for building SCs, PHCs and CHCs to be Rs 24.5 lakh for a PHC, Rs 80.5 lakh for a CHC and Rs 2
lakh for an SC. The cost of upgrading the civil works and equipment in the existing facilities has also been provided by NCMH based on a facility survey carried out in 1999. 
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ture being currently incurred to run the existing SCs, PHCs
and CHCs, it includes the salary expenditure required to pro-
vide these existing facilities with manpower as per the norms.
Second, it includes the expenditure that would be required
to run the new SCs, PHCs and CHCs to be built between 2005-
06 and 2009-10 with adequate number of health workers.5
The additional requirement of resources is estimated as the
extent of resources required over and above the actual expen-
diture as a percentage of the GSDP incurred in 2001-02.6
The estimate indicates that an additional amount of about
Rs 26,439 crore (at 2005-06 prices) is required to provide a
minimum level of access to health care facilities in the States
(Table 2).7 Nearly 60% of this amount is needed in Uttar
Pradesh (UP) and Bihar alone. In general, the five States of
Bihar, UP, Madhya Pradesh (MP), West Bengal and Orissa
account for around 80% of this additional expenditure. The
States of Maharashtra and Karnataka require less than 1% of
this amount, while Kerala requires no additional expendi-
ture.
As a percentage of the GSDP, Bihar, UP, Assam, MP and
Orissa require the highest increases in expenditure in the health
sector. These increases are required despite the level of expen-
diture (as a percentage of the GSDP) in Bihar, Orissa and Assam
being among the highest in the country (Table 2). The rea-
son for this is partly the low levels of GSDP in these States.
This is reflected by the fact that the per capita expenditures
in these States are among the lowest in the country (Table
2). Additionally, in per capita terms, most of the above-men-
tioned States require a relatively high increase.
If one examines the States that lie above the average level
of per capita additional requirement of resources during 2009-
10, the five low-income States of Bihar, UP, Assam, MP and
Orissa are included (Fig. 1). The requirements for Haryana
and West Bengal are also relatively high. It must be noted that
among the selected States, the amount of GSDP devoted by
Haryana towards the health sector is the lowest. As the incomes
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5 For calculating the salary requirements in each year, the Central Government pay scales for different levels of medical personnel at SCs, PHCs and CHCs were used. The population projections 
for the years 2005-06 to 2009-2010 provided by the Registrar General of India were used for the estimations.
6 Data on State Finances of India published by the Reserve Bank of India were used for the actual expenditures.
7 An average inflation rate of 7% was assumed throughout the study.
Fig 1
Per capita additional requirement of resources
in the health sector during 2009-10
State As percentage of the GSDP Real per capita (in Rs) (2005-06 prices)
2005-06 2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 2009-10 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 2009-10
Andhra Pradesh 0.92 0.93 0.93 0.94 0.94 251 253 255 257 258
Assam 1.35 1.37 1.38 1.39 1.40 234 239 243 246 249
Bihar (including Jharkhand) 2.04 2.18 2.31 2.43 2.54 229 247 265 282 298
Gujarat 0.70 0.67 0.65 0.62 0.59 234 225 217 208 199
Haryana 0.64 0.65 0.65 0.66 0.66 248 253 257 260 263
Karnataka 0.95 0.91 0.87 0.83 0.80 269 267 267 267 267
Kerala 0.98 0.95 0.92 0.90 0.87 303 303 303 303 303
MP (including Chhattisgarh) 1.17 1.16 1.16 1.15 1.13 213 213 213 213 213
Maharashtra 0.71 0.69 0.67 0.65 0.63 275 267 260 260 260
Orissa 1.47 1.43 1.39 1.36 1.32 233 229 224 220 214
Punjab 0.94 0.93 0.92 0.92 0.91 373 372 370 368 365
Rajasthan 1.34 1.29 1.25 1.20 1.16 286 278 269 259 250
Tamil Nadu 0.93 0.92 0.90 0.88 0.86 285 281 275 269 261
UP (including Uttaranchal) 1.18 1.22 1.26 1.30 1.33 178 187 195 203 210
West Bengal 0.95 0.99 1.02 1.04 1.06 238 250 260 269 276
Note: Projections of GSDP were made using the prescriptive growth rates suggested by the Twelfth Finance Commission
Table 1
Expenditure requirement for the health sector from 2005-06 to 2009-10of West Bengal and Haryana are relatively high, as a percentage
of the GSDP, their additional requirements are relatively low.
In general, additional requirements both in terms of per capita
as well as GSDP, indicate that Bihar, UP, Assam and MP occupy
the top four positions. The health sector in these States there-
fore needs a special focus.
Safe Drinking Water and Sanitation
According to the 2001 Census, only about 67% of households
in the selected States have access to safe drinking water and
in States such as Assam and Orissa, it is less than 50%. Sim-
ilarly, less than 30% households have access to toilet facili-
ties in Bihar, UP, Orissa, MP and Rajasthan. The percentage
is as low as 15 in Orissa. We now highlight the resource require-
ments for providing all households in the States with access
to safe drinking water and toilet facilities by 2010.8[s1] Table
3 provides the expenditure requirement for water supply and
sanitation from 2005-06 to 2009-10.
The estimation of resource requirements for both water and
sanitation has a capital and a revenue component. The cap-
ital component includes the cost of providing all households
not having access to safe drinking water and toilet facilities
with these facilities. This requirement of expenditure is spread
over a five-year period between 2005-06 and 2009-10. It also
includes the cost of providing the additional population in
each year between 2005-06 and 2009-10 with these facili-
ties. The revenue component includes the expenditure required
for the increased coverage. In the case of safe drinking water,
an additional 10% of the capital cost is included for mainte-
nance of the water supply systems. 
Estimates indicate that an additional amount of Rs 17,593
crore will be required for providing safe drinking water and
toilet facilities to all households (Table 4). Of these, four
States-Kerala, Maharashtra, West Bengal and Orissa-account
for more than 60% of the requirement. The high require-
ment of Kerala may be attributed to the low access to safe
drinking water.9 Only 20% of households in the State have
access to safe drinking water. In contrast, Tamil Nadu, Gujarat,
Haryana and Andhra Pradesh do not require any additional
expenditure. 
As a percentage of the GSDP, excluding Kerala, Assam and
Orissa require the highest increase. Interestingly, Kerala and
Karnataka spent the lowest amount of their GSDP on water
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Additional 
As percentage of the GSDP Real per capita (in Rs) (2005-06 prices) resources required
Current Current (2005-10) 
level level (Rs in crore
State (2001-02) 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 2009-10 (2001-02) 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 2009-10 2005-06) prices
Andhra Pradesh 0.86 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.08 232 19 21 23 25 26 944
Assam 1.04 0.31 0.33 0.34 0.35 0.36 176 59 63 67 70 73 976
Bihar (including  1.27 0.77 0.91 1.04 1.16 1.27 140 88 107 124 141 157 7,150
Jharkhand)
Gujarat 0.58 0.12 0.09 0.07 0.04 0.01 193 41 33 24 15 6 634
Haryana 0.54 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.12 207 41 46 50 53 56 554
Karnataka 0.94 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 267 2 0 0 0 0 10
Kerala 1.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 303 0 0 0 0 0 0
MP (including  0.80 0.37 0.36 0.36 0.35 0.33 148 65 65 65 65 65 2,983
Chhattisgarh)
Maharashtra 0.67 0.04 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 260 15 8 0 0 0 223
Orissa 1.02 0.45 0.41 0.37 0.34 0.30 161 72 68 63 58 53 1,210
Punjab 0.85 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.06 338 35 33 32 30 27 405
Rajasthan 1.10 0.24 0.19 0.15 0.10 0.06 236 50 42 33 23 14 990
Tamil Nadu 0.84 0.09 0.08 0.06 0.04 0.02 256 30 25 19 13 6 612
UP (including  0.74 0.44 0.48 0.52 0.56 0.59 111 66 75 84 91 99 8,463
Uttaranchal)
West Bengal 0.92 0.03 0.07 0.10 0.12 0.14 229 9 20 30 39 47 1,286
Total 26,439
Table 2
Additional requirement of resources for the health sector from 2005-06 to 2009-10
8 It is assumed that 30% of the uncovered population will have access to piped water and the remaining 70% will have access to handpumps. The unit cost of providing piped water was taken 
to be approximately Rs 1200 per capita and that of handpumps Rs 140 per capita. A unit cost of Rs 1000 was taken for building a toilet per household.
9 Partly, the high requirement in Kerala despite it being a high rainfall State is due to the definition of safe drinking water. A large proportion of the population in the State uses the well water,
which is considered unsafe. Also, the requirement of the State is an overestimate as the unit cost of providing safe water in Kerala would be lower due to the existence of many sweet water
bodies and river systems, and economies of scale due to high density of population.260 NCMH Background Papers-Health Systems in India: Delivery and Financing of Services
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State As percentage of the GSDP Real per capita (in Rs) (2005-06 prices)
2005-06 2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 2009-10 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 2009-10
Andhra Pradesh 0.29 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 81 81 81 81 81
Assam 0.82 0.88 0.93 0.98 1.03 146 159 170 182 195
Bihar (including Jharkhand) 0.68 0.69 0.70 0.71 0.72 76 77 78 80 81
Gujarat 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.20 0.20 88 88 88 88 88
Haryana 0.56 0.58 0.59 0.61 0.62 278 278 278 278 278
Karnataka 0.43 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44 126 131 92 92 92
Kerala 0.54 0.65 0.74 0.83 0.91 176 218 255 294 332
MP (including Chhattisgarh) 0.72 0.73 0.73 0.73 0.73 131 134 135 136 137
Maharashtra 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.31 118 120 122 123 130
Orissa 1.13 1.22 1.29 1.36 1.41 180 197 212 228 241
Punjab 0.29 0.29 0.28 0.28 0.27 117 118 114 114 110
Rajasthan 1.18 1.25 1.30 1.35 1.39 275 275 280 291 302
Tamil Nadu 0.26 0.26 0.25 0.25 0.24 143 143 143 143 143
UP (including Uttaranchal) 0.49 0.48 0.47 0.47 0.46 75 74 73 73 72
West Bengal 0.43 0.44 0.45 0.45 0.46 112 117 123 125 131
Note: Projections of GSDP were made using the prescriptive growth rates suggested by the Twelfth Finance Commission
Table 3
Expenditure requirement for water supply and sanitation from 2005-06 to 2009-10
Additional 
As percentage of the GSDP Real per capita (in Rs) (2005-06 prices) resources required
Current Current (2005-10) 
level level (Rs in crore
State (2001-02) 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 2009-10 (2001-02) 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 2009-10 2005-06) prices
Andhra Pradesh 0.30 0 0 0 0 0 81 0 0 0 0 0 0
Assam 0.46 0.36 0.42 0.47 0.52 0.57 79 67 80 92 104 116 1,349
Bihar (including  0.57 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.15 63 13 14 15 17 19 897
Jharkhand)
Gujarat 0.26 0 0 0 0 0 88 0 0 0 0 0 0
Haryana 0.73 0 0 0 0 0 278 0 0 0 0 0 0
Karnataka 0.32 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 92 34 39 0 0 0 415
Kerala 0.18 0.36 0.47 0.56 0.65 0.73 52 123 165 202 242 279 3,532
MP (including  0.51 0.21 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 94 37 39 40 41 43 1,842
Chhattisgarh)
Maharashtra 0.19 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.12 73 45 47 48 50 57 2,455
Orissa 0.57 0.56 0.65 0.72 0.79 0.84 90 89 107 122 137 150 2,336
Punjab 0.25 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.02 101 16 17 13 13 9 175
Rajasthan 1.28 0 0 0.02 0.07 0.11 275 0 0 4 16 26 300
Tamil Nadu 0.47 0 0 0 0 0 143 0 0 0 0 0 0
UP (including  0.36 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.1 55 20 19 18 18 17 1,834
Uttaranchal)
West Bengal 0.27 0.16 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.19 66 47 52 57 59 65 2,459
Total 17,593
Table 4
Additional requirement of resources for water supply and sanitation from 2005-06 to 2009-10supply and sanitation in 2001-02 among the selected States.
Given the low level of spending in Kerala and the low access
to safe drinking water, marked increases in expenditure,
both as a percentage of the GSDP and per capita are required
in the State. While Karnataka also requires a substantial increase
in per capita terms, given its income level, the required increase
as a percentage of the GSDP is relatively moderate. Apart from
these States, West Bengal requires a marked increase both in
per capita terms as well as a percentage of the GSDP (Table
4). The two low-income States of Assam and Orissa require
special policy focus.
Nutrition
One of the primary causes of infant and child mortality in
India is maternal and child malnutrition. Keeping this in
view, policy stance in recent times have focused on provid-
ing nutritional supplements to pregnant and lactating moth-
ers and undernourished children. However, the coverage of
the provision of nutritional supplements has not yet been uni-
versal. We now estimate the resource requirements for mak-
ing this universal. Specifically, we estimate the requirement
of resources for providing nutritional supplements to all
malnourished children in the age group of 6-71 months, and
all pregnant and lactating mothers below the poverty line.
The unit cost of providing nutritional supplements to chil-
dren in the age group of 6-71 months under the ICDS scheme
is Rs 3.10 per child per day. Similarly, the unit cost of provid-
ing nutritional supplements to severely malnourished chil-
dren is Rs 3.81 per child per day and to pregnant and lactat-
ing mothers Rs 3.41 per beneficiary per day. These unit costs
are used to estimate the expenditure requirements. It may be
noted that the above-mentioned unit cost for providing nutri-
tional supplements is abysmally low. However, as these norms
have been specified by the Government of India, they have
been used to estimate the expenditure requirements. Table 5
provides the expenditure requirements for providing nutri-
tional supplements from 2005-06 to 2009-10.
A total of Rs 56,383 crore is additionally required for pro-
viding nutritional supplements to all malnourished children
between the age of 6 and 71 months, and pregnant and lac-
tating mothers below the poverty line (Table 6). Of this,
more than 50% is required in Bihar and UP alone. Uttar Pradesh
alone calls for more than 30% of this required expenditure.
Madhya Pradesh, West Bengal and Rajasthan along with UP
and Bihar account for almost 80% of the requirement. In con-
trast, Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh spend a substantial
amount of their GSDP on nutrition and therefore do not
need any additional expenditure.
As a percentage of the GSDP, Bihar, UP, MP, Orissa and
Rajasthan occupy the top five positions in terms of require-
ment. Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu have the highest expen-
diture both as a percentage of the GSDP and in per capita
terms, and therefore do not require any increase in expendi-
ture. Kerala, Maharashtra, Punjab and Haryana require an
increase of less than 0.2% of their GSDP. In terms of per capita,
Bihar, UP, Orissa, MP and Rajasthan require substantial increase
(Table 6). Thus, Bihar, UP, Orissa, MP and Rajasthan call for
a special policy focus.
Primary Schooling
We now estimate the expenditure requirement for providing
primary schooling to all children in the age group of 5-14
years in selected States. It is important to note that univer-
salizing primary education is not only important for achiev-
ing health outcomes, but also has various other positive exter-
nalities. In fact, bringing all children to school is an MDG as
well as a Tenth Plan goal by itself. The expenditure required
for universalizing primary education therefore should not be
seen as a requirement for achieving health outcomes alone.
The capital cost for universalizing elementary education
was estimated based on the report of the Expert Group on
Financial Requirements for Making Elementary Education a
Fundamental Right (GOI 1999). The estimates provided in the
above study were modified for the number of schools built
between 1993 and 2002 (based on the Sixth and Seventh
School Education Survey). The revenue expenditure require-
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Fig 2
Additional requirement for water supply and
sanitation, 2009-10 (per capita) 
Fig 3
Additional resource requirement for providing
nutritional supplements, 2009-10ment was calculated based on an estimate of an average expen-
diture per child in primary school provided by the National
Commission on Macroeconomics and Health (NCMH). As ear-
lier, requirement of capital expenditure is distributed over a
five-year period between 2005-06 and 2009-10 (Table 7).
An additional amount of Rs 106,008 crore is required to pro-
vide all children with primary schooling (Table 8). Of these,
the States of Bihar, UP and Gujarat account for the largest
share. The high requirement of Gujarat may be attributed to
the fall in the number of primary schools in the State between
1993 and 2002 (Sixth and Seventh All India School Educa-
tion Survey).10 Apart from these States, MP and West Bengal
call for a substantial increase in expenditure. The five States
of Bihar, UP, Gujarat, MP and West Bengal account for more
than 90% of the requirement. On the other hand, Tamil Nadu,
Karnataka, Kerala and Maharashtra do not require any addi-
tional expenditure (Fig. 4). However, even in these States, all
children are not in school and therefore one might need to
identify the possible reasons for why these children have
262 NCMH Background Papers-Health Systems in India: Delivery and Financing of Services
SECTION IV Resource Devolution from the Centre to States: Enhancing the Revenue Capacity of States for
State As percentage of the GSDP Real per capita (in Rs) (2005-06 prices)
2005-06 2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 2009-10 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 2009-10
Andhra Pradesh 0.23 0.24 0.25 0.29 0.27 94 94 94 94 94
Assam 0.53 0.55 0.58 0.66 0.63 96 102 110 128 124
Bihar (including Jharkhand) 1.49 1.56 1.64 1.88 1.81 172 183 196 229 225
Gujarat 0.28 0.28 0.29 0.33 0.31 95 98 104 122 118
Haryana 0.18 0.19 0.19 0.22 0.21 74 80 82 97 95
Karnataka 0.28 0.29 0.30 0.33 0.31 85 91 26 26 26
Kerala 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.16 0.15 45 50 52 60 58
MP (including Chhattisgarh) 0.87 0.91 0.95 1.08 1.03 152 163 174 203 198
Maharashtra 0.25 0.26 0.27 0.30 0.28 100 105 111 127 120
Orissa 0.79 0.82 0.85 0.96 0.92 126 134 142 165 162
Punjab 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.15 0.15 53 54 60 66 67
Rajasthan 0.64 0.67 0.69 0.78 0.74 134 144 152 177 173
Tamil Nadu 0.20 0.20 0.21 0.23 0.22 97 97 97 97 97
UP (including Uttaranchal) 0.98 1.03 1.07 1.23 1.17 149 160 170 200 195
West Bengal 0.35 0.36 0.37 0.41 0.39 101 107 114 132 130
Note: Projections of GSDP were made using the prescriptive growth rates suggested by the Twelfth Finance Commission
Table 5
Expenditure requirement for providing nutritional supplements from 2005-06 to 2009-10
Fig 4
Additional resource requirement for primary
schooling, 2009-10
Note: Resource requirements for Gujarat are high due to data
problems
Fig 5
Additional resource requirement for
construction of roads, 2009-10
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State As percentage of the GSDP Real per capita (in Rs) (2005-06 prices)
2005-06 2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 2009-10 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 2009-10
Andhra Pradesh 1.49 1.45 1.41 1.37 1.34 416 406 397 386 379
Assam 3.14 3.07 3.00 2.92 2.85 531 527 527 527 527
Bihar (including Jharkhand) 5.60 5.48 5.36 5.25 5.14 632 624 616 609 602
Gujarat 4.12 3.93 3.74 3.56 3.39 1386 1356 1322 1288 1254
Haryana 1.17 1.13 1.10 1.07 1.03 450 433 429 429 429
Karnataka 1.51 1.45 1.39 1.33 1.28 439 439 439 439 439
Kerala 1.06 1.03 1.00 0.97 0.94 419 419 419 419 419
MP (including Chhattisgarh) 3.15 3.07 2.98 2.90 2.82 567 560 550 542 533
Maharashtra 1.26 1.21 1.17 1.13 1.08 707 707 707 707 707
Orissa 3.37 3.27 3.18 3.09 2.99 537 526 515 504 491
Punjab 1.23 1.20 1.17 1.14 1.10 494 488 481 474 462
Rajasthan 2.94 2.83 2.73 2.63 2.53 628 610 593 575 555
Tamil Nadu 1.14 1.09 1.04 0.99 0.95 392 392 392 392 392
UP (including Uttaranchal) 3.61 3.52 3.44 3.36 3.29 546 538 531 523 516
West Bengal 2.19 2.10 2.01 1.92 1.84 595 581 566 550 535
Note: Projections of GSDP were made using the prescriptive growth rates suggested by the Twelfth Finance Commission
Table 7
Expenditure requirements for providing primary schooling to all children from 2005-06 to 2009-10
Additional 
As percentage of the GSDP Real per capita (in Rs) (2005-06 prices) resources required
Current Current (2005-10) 
level level (Rs in crore
State (2001-02) 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 2009-10 (2001-02) 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 2009-10 2005-06) prices
Andhra Pradesh 0.35 0 0 0 0 0 94 0 0 0 0 0 0
Assam 0.11 0.42 0.44 0.47 0.55 0.52 18 78 84 92 110 106 1,379
Bihar (including  0.05 1.44 1.51 1.59 1.83 1.76 7 165 176 189 222 218 11,204
Jharkhand)
Gujarat 0.10 0.18 0.18 0.19 0.23 0.21 34 61 64 70 88 84 1,979
Haryana 0.05 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.17 0.16 20 54 60 62 77 75 736
Karnataka 0.09 0.19 0.2 0.21 0.24 0.22 26 59 65 0 0 0 703
Kerala 0.00 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.16 0.15 1 44 49 51 59 57 910
MP (including  0.10 0.77 0.81 0.85 0.98 0.93 18 134 145 156 185 180 7,365
Chhattisgarh)
Maharashtra 0.16 0.09 0.1 0.11 0.14 0.12 63 37 42 48 64 57 2,471
Orissa 0.11 0.68 0.71 0.74 0.85 0.81 17 109 117 125 148 145 2,478
Punjab 0.00 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.15 0.15 0 53 54 60 66 67 775
Rajasthan 0.15 0.49 0.52 0.54 0.63 0.59 31 103 113 121 146 142 3,876
Tamil Nadu 0.32 0 0 0 0 0 97 0 0 0 0 0 0
UP (including  0.00 0.98 1.03 1.07 1.23 1.17 0 149 160 170 200 195 17,814
Uttaranchal)
West Bengal 0.04 0.31 0.32 0.33 0.37 0.35 10 91 97 104 122 120 4,693
Total 56,383
Table 6
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Additional 
As percentage of the GSDP Per capita (in Rs) (2005-06 prices) resources required
Current Current (2005-10) 
level level (Rs in crore
State (2001-02) 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 2009-10 (2001-02) 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 2009-10 2005-06) prices
Andhra Pradesh 1.08 0.41 0.37 0.33 0.29 0.26 291 124 115 105 95 88 4,338
Assam 3.12 0.02 0 0 0 0 527 4 0 0 0 0 11
Bihar (including  2.62 2.98 2.86 2.74 2.63 2.52 290 342 334 326 319 312 18,782
Jharkhand)
Gujarat 1.41 2.71 2.52 2.33 2.15 1.98 466 920 890 856 822 788 23,037
Haryana 1.12 0.05 0.01 0 0 0 429 21 4 0 0 0 54
Karnataka 1.54 0 0 0 0 0 439 0 0 0 0 0 0
Kerala 1.40 0 0 0 0 0 419 0 0 0 0 0 0
MP (including  1.56 1.59 1.51 1.42 1.34 1.26 289 277 270 261 253 244 11,963
Chhattisgarh)
Maharashtra 1.82 0 0 0 0 0 707 0 0 0 0 0 0
Orissa 2.25 1.12 1.02 0.93 0.84 0.74 358 179 167 157 146 132 3,006
Punjab 0.63 0.6 0.57 0.54 0.51 0.47 251 243 237 230 223 211 2,956
Rajasthan 2.10 0.84 0.73 0.63 0.53 0.43 452 176 158 141 123 103 4,321
Tamil Nadu 1.29 0 0 0 0 0 392 0 0 0 0 0 0
UP (including  1.97 1.64 1.55 1.47 1.39 1.32 296 249 241 234 226 220 23,728
Uttaranchal)
West Bengal 1.01 1.18 1.09 1 0.91 0.83 250 345 332 316 300 285 13,811
Total 106,008
Table 8
Additional requirement for providing primary schooling from 2005-06 to 2009-10
State As a percentage of the GSDP Real per capita (in Rs) (2005-06 prices Additional
2005-06 2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 2009-10 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 2009-10 resources required
(2005-10)(Rs in
crore 2005-06)  prices
Andhra Pradesh 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.07 18 19 22 23 24 873
Assam 1.90 2.02 2.12 2.22 2.30 355 385 413 442 469 6,061
Bihar (including Jharkhand) 1.69 1.79 1.88 1.97 2.04 194 209 224 239 252 12,902
Gujarat 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.18 0.18 54 60 62 69 72 1,714
Haryana 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0 0 0 0 0 0
Karnataka 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 16 16 17 18 18 489
Kerala 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 3 4 4 4 8 77
MP (including Chhattisgarh) 2.96 3.11 3.25 3.38 3.48 517 557 597 637 674 27,419
Maharashtra 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.10 37 38 39 45 47 2,063
Orissa 3.33 3.53 3.71 3.87 4.02 532 579 626 672 718 12,065
Punjab 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 12 12 13 13 13 166
Rajasthan 0.81 0.85 0.88 0.90 0.92 170 184 197 209 221 6,085
Tamil Nadu 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.08 22 23 24 29 30 855
UP (including Uttaranchal) 0.82 0.86 0.90 0.93 0.96 125 134 143 152 160 14,513
West Bengal 0.57 0.59 0.61 0.63 0.64 167 179 193 208 220 8,485
Total 93,765
Table 9
Additional requirement for connecting all habitations by road from 2005-06 to 2009-10 remained out of school and spend on appropriate heads
required to bring these children to school.
Roads
Recognizing the importance of roads, the Prime Minister’s
Gram Sadak Yojana (PMGSY) was introduced in December
2000. This scheme aims to connect all rural habitations by
roads. The cost is based on information provided by PMGSY.
As in the case of primary schooling, apart from the positive
impact on health outcomes, expenditure on roads has other
positive externalities too. This expenditure therefore should
not be treated as an expenditure that is exclusively directed
towards health outcomes. 
As of March 2004, Bihar, UP, MP and West Bengal had the
highest number of unconnected habitations among the 15
States.Table 9shows that these four States account for approx-
imately two-thirds of the total requirement of resources. If
one includes the requirement for Orissa, the total share of
resources required in these States increases to more than 80%.
For all selected States taken together, a sum of about Rs
93,765 crore is required for connecting all habitations by roads.
While in absolute terms, the five States of Bihar, UP, MP,
West Bengal and Orissa account for the largest share, as a per-
centage of the GSDP, the States of Orissa, Assam, Bihar and
MP require significant increases.
Table 10 shows the total additional requirement of resources
in different sectors from 2005-06 to 2009-10. For health,
water, sanitation and nutrition alone, a total of Rs 100,415
crore is required over the next five years. If one adds up the
expenditure for primary schooling and roads, the require-
ments almost triple. The total combined requirement of all
sectors is of the order of Rs 300,188 crore. The requirement
for primary schooling alone is more than the combined require-
ment of health, water, sanitation and nutrition. If one focuses
on the low-income States of Assam, Bihar, Orissa, MP and
UP, which is just around the average of the selected States,
the requirements are of the order of Rs 199,730 crore (Fig.
6). Even if one focuses only on health, water, sanitation and
nutrition, the requirements are about Rs 70,000 crore.
Figure 6 shows that excluding Gujarat, whose require-
ments are primarily determined by high requirements for pri-
mary schooling (mainly due to data problems), MP, Orissa,
Bihar, Assam, West Bengal and UP occupy the top positions
in terms of additional per capita requirements in the terminal
year 2009-10. In fact, UP, MP and Bihar account for more than
50% of the additional requirement of resources (Table 10).
Even if one focuses only on health, water, sanitation and nutri-
tion, Bihar, UP and MP occupy the top positions. These States
therefore require a special policy attention. The requirement
of Kerala is primarily determined by its high requirement for
safe drinking water. In contrast, Karnataka, Tamil Nadu, Haryana,
Andhra Pradesh and Maharashtra occupy the lowest posi-
tions in terms of additional requirements. 
It is interesting to note that the additional expenditure
requirements are particularly high in States with low per capita
GSDP. Figure 7indicates the association of the additional per
capita expenditure requirements in the year 2009-10 with
current (2002-03) per capita income of States. Low-income
States are also the ones with high poverty (the correlation of
per capita income with poverty in States is more than 0.8).
Thus, in general, lower the income level of a State, higher is
its expenditure requirement for health outcomes. This point
underlines the importance of expenditures on anti-poverty
programmes including employment creation and income-
generation activities, particularly in States with higher con-
centration of poverty. The estimated additional requirement
has to be met either with additional mobilization of resources
at the State-level or through Central transfers. We now assess
the extent of resources that can be mobilized at the State level. 
Mobilization of resources by States to meet
additional resource requirements for health
expenditure
NCMH Background Papers-Health Systems in India: Delivery and Financing of Services 265
Resource Devolution from the Centre to States: Enhancing the Revenue Capacity of States for Implementation of
Fig 6
State-wise total per capita additional
requirement of resources, 2009-10
Note: The requirements for Gujarat are affected by problems in
data on schooling.
Fig 7
Per capita additional resource requirement and
per capita income of the StatesTo identify the extent to which resources can be mobilized
at the State level to meet health requirements, two possibil-
ities have been explored: first, reprioritization and realloca-
tion of the States’ existing resources towards health and sec-
ond, generation of additional revenues. 
Reallocation of resources
To examine the extent of reallocation possible, expenditures
in States are classified into two groups: committed and dis-
cretionary (non-committed). Committed expenditures are
those for which the States are assumed to assign high prior-
ity and are committed to spend on. Although all expendi-
tures are discretionary in the medium and long term, the dis-
tinction is legitimate in the short and medium term and the
policy-makers are always confronted with this distinction. For
the purpose of this analysis, it is assumed that States are
committed to meet the expenditure on wages and salaries,
interest payments and pensions on a priority basis and that
the resources used up for meeting these expenditures can-
not be reallocated. The residual revenue that remains with
States after meeting expenditures on wages and salaries, inter-
est payments and pensions is termed as discretionary and is
assumed to be available for reallocation towards health. 
An analysis of the extent of discretionary resources available
with States calls for an evaluation of the extent of expenditure
on pensions, interest payments and salaries that would be
incurred in each State during the next five years. Such an assess-
ment has been carried out for interest payments and pensions
by the Twelfth Finance Commission (TFC) using various assump-
tions on the States’ capability to contain these expenditures.
While the projections of interest payments and pensions in the
States by the TFC may seem to be on the lower side relative to
what it would be if the past rate of growth of these expendi-
tures continued, the TFC estimate provides a benchmark for
these expenditures, which the States should strive to achieve.
Given the objective of this exercise to arrive at the maximum
discretionary resources available with the States, these bench-
mark estimates for interest payments and pensions have been
used in this analysis. The salary expenditure, however, is likely
to be difficult to contain in the recent future. Although the
TFC has suggested that States should attempt to achieve the
ratio of salary expenditure to revenue expenditure at 1996-97
levels, these levels may be difficult to achieve in the next five
years. Salary expenditures in this analysis are therefore projected
based on their growth rate between 1994-95 and 2002-03.11
An examination of the share of committed expenditures in
total revenues over the next five years (Table 11)indicates that
in many cases, a large portion of States’ revenues will be used
up for meeting the committed expenses, leaving very little for
discretionary expenditure.12States such as Assam, Orissa, Bihar,
Punjab and West Bengal are unlikely to have any resources avail-
able for discretionary expenditure in the next five years. In five
out of the remaining ten States, committed expenditure will
use up more than 80% of their resources in the recent future.
It is disturbing to note that States which have a high require-
ment of health expenditure are particularly stressed in terms
of availability of resources for reallocation towards health. 
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States Health sector Water andsanitation Nutrition Total(I) Primary schooling Roads Total(II) Total(I+II)
Andhra Pradesh 944 0 0 944 4,338 873 5,211 6,155
Assam 976 1,349 1,379 3,704 11 6,061 6,072 9,776
Bihar (including Jharkhand) 7,150 897 11,204 19,251 18,782 12,902 31,684 50,935
Gujarat 634 0 1,979 2,613 23,037 1,714 24,751 27,364
Haryana 554 0 736 1,290 54 0 54 1,344
Karnataka 10 415 703 1,128 0 489 489 1,617
Kerala 0 3,532 910 4,442 0 77 77 4,519
MP (including Chhattisgarh) 2,983 1,842 7,365 12,190 11,963 27,419 39,382 51,572
Maharashtra 223 2,455 2,471 5,149 0 2,063 2,063 7,212
Orissa 1,210 2,336 2,478 6,024 3,006 12,065 15,071 21,095
Punjab 405 175 775 1,355 2,956 166 3,122 4,477
Rajasthan 990 300 3,876 5,166 4,321 6,085 10,406 15,572
Tamil Nadu 612 0 0 612 0 855 855 1,467
UP (including Uttaranchal) 8,463 1,834 17,814 28,111 23,728 14,513 38,241 66,352
West Bengal 1,286 2,459 4,693 8,438 13,811 8,485 22,296 30,734
Total 26,439 17,593 56,383 100,415 106,008 93,765 199,773 300,188
Table 10
State-wise additional resource requirements from 2005-06 to 2009-10 (Rs in crore) at 2005-06 prices
11Data on salary expenditure between 1994-95 and 2002-03 have been taken from the TFC.
12Projections of total revenues in States were based on the past growth rate of revenues between 1993-94 and 2002-03 based on data provided by the TFCWhatever discretionary resources are available, this
analysis assumes that at the most 5% of resources
available for discretionary expenditures in the years
2005-06 to 2009-10 can be reprioritized towards
health. This would mean that 5% of the discretionary
resources would have to be extracted from non-health
sectors and reallocated towards health. Diversion of
resources from non-health to health sectors how-
ever would require a detailed cost-benefit analysis of
expenditure on various sectors and needs to be care-
fully worked out.13The additional resources that can
be reallocated towards health, family welfare, water
supply and sanitation through 5% reallocation of dis-
cretionary expenditures are shown in Table 12. 
It is evident that the extent of additional resources
that can be directed towards health, family welfare,
water supply, sanitation and nutrition through real-
location of discretionary resources are limited at the
moment. This, however, does not mean that over
time, it is not possible to reduce outlay on pay and
pensions or interest payments. To reduce salary expen-
diture, as the TFC highlights, States will either have
to (i) reduce the number of employees, (ii) reduce
the average per employee salary or (iii) increase the
revenue receipts without increasing the revenue deficit.
The first route is likely to be easier and checking the
growth of the number of employees in States is
likely to be effective in reaching the target. In fact,
many States have exercised restraint on expenditure
on wages and salaries by not filling the vacancies cre-
ated by the attrition at least partially. The TFC has
also pointed out that the debt situation is particu-
larly bad in Bihar, Himachal Pradesh, Kerala, Orissa,
Punjab, Rajasthan, UP and West Bengal, which has
led to high interest payments in these States. The
TFC’s suggestion for swapping high-cost debt incurred
on account of small savings loans with the market
borrowing at lower rate of interest, if implemented
would provide some relief on interest payments to
State Governments. Also, debt rescheduling recom-
mended by the TFC can provide considerable relief.
The incentive-based debt write off too will help the
State governments in exercising fiscal prudence and
reducing the revenue deficits. Similarly, the structural
and parametric changes on pensions suggested by
the expert committee set up to study the pension lia-
bilities of State Governments if implemented would
provide considerable relief. Although the effects of
structural changes will fructify only in the long run,
the parametric changes can bring about some imme-
diate relief on pension payments.
Generation of additional revenue
States can generate additional revenue either through
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Table 11
Committed expenditure as percentage of the total revenues
in States between 2005-06 and 2009-10
State 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 2009-10
Andhra Pradesh 70.38 68.50 66.69 64.95 63.27
Assam 105.58 108.01 110.54 113.17 115.90
Bihar (including Jharkand) 101.69 101.25 100.86 100.49 100.16
Gujarat 46.41 45.29 44.21 43.17 42.15
Haryana 79.28 79.75 80.11 80.43 80.72
Karnataka 71.17 70.87 70.59 70.32 70.06
Kerala 96.36 95.63 94.92 94.23 93.56
Madhya Pradesh  76.37 77.75 79.22 80.78 82.44
(including Chhattisgarh) 
Maharashtra 92.80 94.08 95.44 96.87 98.38
Orissa 105.26 104.97 104.76 104.62 104.54
Punjab 117.02 117.60 118.33 119.21 120.25
Rajasthan 95.79 95.90 96.09 96.36 96.69
Tamil Nadu 83.15 82.93 82.72 82.53 82.34
Uttar Pradesh  86.64 85.41 84.25 83.13 82.07
(including Uttaranchal)
West Bengal 138.88 139.17 139.60 140.18 140.91
Table 12
State-wise additional resources that can be directed towards
health, family welfare, water supply, sanitation and nutrition
by reallocating 5% of discretionary resources
Percentage of the GSDP
State 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 2009-10
Andhra Pradesh 0.20 0.22 0.23 0.25 0.27
Assam 0 0 0 0 0
Bihar (including Jharkand) 0 0 0 0 0
Gujarat 0.37 0.37 0.38 0.38 0.38
Haryana 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13
Karnataka 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18
Kerala 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04
Madhya Pradesh  0.20 0.18 0.17 0.16 0.14
(including Chhattisgarh)
Maharashtra 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01
Orissa 0 0 0 0 0
Punjab 0 0 0 0 0
Rajasthan 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02
Tamil Nadu 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.11
Uttar Pradesh  0.10 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.13
(including Uttaranchal)
West Bengal 0 0 0 0 0
Note: Projections of GSDP have been made using the prescriptive growth rates suggested by the Twelfth Finance Commission
13The 5% of discretionary resources that can be reallocated towards health is over and above the discretionary resources already allocated towards health.tax or non-tax sources. In this section, the potential for gener-
ating additional tax revenue is first examined. 
The issue of tax potential has attracted the attention of
the researchers in the past. At one level, there are some schol-
ars such as Colin Clarke who preferred to make judgements
about tax revenue that should/could be mobilized and he sug-
gested that the ratio of 25% of the GDP as the norm. In con-
trast, e.g. Musgrave has suggested that absolute taxable capac-
ity is a myth and specifying this involves making arbitrary
judgements. Therefore, the scholars should be concerned with
‘optimal budgets’ which meant that each country should
determine decisions to raise revenues depending on the degree
of market failure and the extent of state intervention envis-
aged. Here again, Musgrave suggests the need to make a
crucial difference between public provision and public pro-
duction of services (Musgrave 1973).
While absolute taxable capacity is difficult to conceptual-
ize and impossible to measure in any objective sense, Mus-
grave (1959) emphasizes the relevance and importance of rel-
ative taxable capacity. This can be estimated by comparing
different countries or sub-national units in a federation. Thus,
two countries or sub-national units in a country which are
similar in economic circumstances should be able to gener-
ate equal amount of revenue and the differences could then
be attributed to the differences in their preference patterns.
Thus taxable capacity of different units in a federation can
be estimated by estimating the ‘average’ behaviour of the
States in raising revenues after controlling for economic fac-
tors that can cause differences in taxable capacity.
Thus, taxable capacity of a country/State is defined as the
revenue it can generate if it levied an average effective rate
of tax on its base (Bahl 1971, 1972). Alternatively, one can
also specify and estimate taxable capacity with respect to the
highest effective tax rate or any other exogenously specified
effective tax rate. Given that the ability to raise tax revenues
may be more than proportionately higher in a more devel-
oped country/State, the effective tax rate will have to be deter-
mined with respect to the development of a particular State
and a simple average would not serve the purpose. This, there-
fore, has to be estimated using statistical techniques to take
account of the non-linear relationship between the level of
development and taxable capacity.
Variations (variance) in tax revenues between different
States (σt2) may be due to variations in their capacity to raise
revenues (σtc2) or variations in the efforts put in by them (σte2). 
σt2 = σtc2 + σte2 ..............................(1)
If one were able to identify all the factors that contributed
to taxable capacity variation, it would be possible to esti-
mate it. Alternatively, if one controlled for variations in tax
effort among States, it would be possible to derive their tax-
able capacity. 
There are three alternative methods employed to estimate
taxable capacities of the States. These are: (i) aggregate regres-
sion (AR) approach; (ii) representative tax system (RTS) approach;
(iii) tax frontier approach. Appropriateness of a method to be
employed to estimate taxable capacity depends on the avail-
ability of disaggregated data, the extent to which the rela-
tionship between taxable capacity and the variables repre-
senting it are perceived to be non-linear, and the degree of
interdependence of the tax base with tax rate. It is useful to
discuss the three methods used in some detail.
Aggregate regression approach
In the AR method, the actual tax revenue (termed as tax
performance) is regressed on all factors representing varia-
tions in taxable capacity. Thus, tax-GSDP ratio or per capita
tax revenue of the States are regressed on taxable capacity
variables. Taxable capacity variables essentially represent the
variables representing the tax bases or their proxies. This
can be done in a cross-section model or, in order to get greater
degrees of freedom, by combining cross-sections in a co-
variance model. The estimated parameters of the equation
provide behavioural relationship between tax-GSDP ratio
(or per capita tax revenue) and various capacity factors esti-
mated in the equation. If it is hypothesized that the taxable
capacity is a non-linear function of taxable capacity vari-
ables, it is possible to make the hypothesized functional spec-
ification in the model. 
Once the behavioural relationship is estimated, it is easy to
estimate the taxable capacity by substituting the actual val-
ues of the taxable capacity variables in the equation. The esti-
mated coefficient for each capacity variable gives the ‘aver-
age’ behavioural relationship and substituting the actual
capacity variables provides the estimate of taxable capacity
of each State. The estimation of tax capacity above assumes
that the coefficients of the respective bases (which indicate
the average effective rate at which the bases are used across
States) represent the normative rates at which States ought
to raise taxes. The residual term, which is the difference between
the actual tax revenue and the estimated tax capacity, is then
used to indicate the tax effort of the respective States. 
There are a number of shortcomings in this approach. First,
it may not be able to include exhaustible list of taxable capac-
ity factors and, therefore, the unexplained variation, which is
attributed to tax effort may actually be due to omitted vari-
ables. Second, even if it is assumed that all taxable capacity
factors are included, the residual variation is the combina-
tion of variations in tax effort and the random error term and
to attribute it entirely to tax effort may not be appropriate.
Finally, some variables may impact on both taxable capacity
and tax effort and it may not always be possible to isolate
the effect of capacity from effort variables. Thus, higher per
capita GSDP or urbanization in State may also represent bet-
ter organization of the economy and ensure greater effort. 
Later studies have tried to improve upon this implicit assump-
tion by separating out the effect of tax effort of individual
States from the random error element by combining cross-
section observations over time and introducing State-specific
fixed effects in the regression specification using panel data
(First Report of the Ninth Finance Commission 1988, Con-
doo et al. 2000). However, it is important to note that the
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other factors and not entirely due to tax effort. Any omitted
variable that is specific to the State and changes slowly (or
does not) over time will also be captured by the State-spe-
cific fixed effect. Hence, what portion of the State-specific
fixed effect can be attributed exclusively to tax effort may be
an arguable issue.
Representative tax system approach
The representative tax system (RTS) approach to measuring
taxable capacity was first employed by the Advisory Com-
mission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR) in the United
States. In this approach, taxable capacity is estimated for each
of the taxes levied by the States. The taxable capacity of each
tax is estimated by applying the ‘representative’ rate to the
tax base of the State. The generally taken representative rate
is the average effective rate of each of the taxes levied in States.
This is estimated by dividing all States’ revenue collection from
the tax with the sum of the value of the tax base over all the
States. As in the AR approach, this assumes that the average
effective tax rate of the States is the normative rate at which
the States ought to levy. The taxable capacity of different
taxes is summed to arrive at the aggregate taxable capacity
of a State. The ratio of actual tax collection to the tax capac-
ity (as estimated above) then provides an indicator of the rel-
ative tax efforts of different States. 
The major shortcoming of this approach is that it assumes
that individual tax bases are independent of each other (Sec-
ond Report of the Ninth Finance Commission). Second, the
approach assumes that tax bases and rates are independent
of each other and the average effective rates adequately
capture the non-linear relationship between the tax bases and
rates (Sen and Tulasidhar 1988). Besides, the data require-
ment for applying this approach is large and in most cases
disaggregated data on various tax bases or even their close
proxies are simply not available. The method is also suitable
only when there is significant homogeneity in the tax struc-
tures (Chelliah and Sinha 1983). 
Tax frontier approach
In the tax frontier (TF) approach, the taxable capacity of States
is conceived as a production frontier and the distance from the
frontier is considered as the tax effort. Thus, technical efficiency
is interpreted as the tax efficiency of States or the tax effort.
The main difference of the TF approach with the AR and the
RTS approach is in the way in which the normative rate for
estimating tax capacity is indexed. While in the TF approach
the normative rate is equated with the highest rate, it is the
‘average’ rate that is used as the norm in the AR and RTS
approaches. The TF approach has however been criticized on
the grounds that the formulation of tax capacity as a produc-
tion frontier is ill-conceived. It is argued that unlike firms, whose
objective is to maximize profits, the primary objective of States
is not to maximize tax revenue (Coondoo et al. 2000). 
Thus, all the existing methods to measuring taxable capac-
ity and effort have shortcomings. In addition, there is a seri-
ous problem in the States’ tax system in India which prevents
the objective assessment of the taxable capacities of the States.
It must be noted that States’ sales taxes, which contribute to
about two-thirds of own tax revenues, are not destination
based. The system of cascading sales taxes coupled with the
levy of inter-State sales tax results in significant inter-State
tax exportation (Rao and Singh 2005). When there is full for-
ward shifting of the tax, inter-State tax exportation is from
the richer to poorer States. Thus, tax revenues collected by
State Governments include collections from non-residents. 
In this exercise, we have used the AR approach to measure
taxable capacity of the States with some modifications. As the
emphasis is on generating additional revenue to create fiscal
space for financing incremental expenditure in the health sec-
tor, the study first tries to project tax revenues at average effort
and then tries to measure the revenue gains through increase
in the effort itself. 
As mentioned earlier, the relative taxable capacity using
the regression approach is estimated by regressing the vari-
ables representing the tax bases and their proxies on the tax-
GSDP ratio of the States in cross-section regression. Apart
from tax bases, it also requires the identification of other
factors that facilitate revenue collections, particularly those
representing organization of the economy. Earlier studies have
used various indicators to estimate tax performance. The most
common indicator that has been used in almost all studies
on the issue is the State income (Nambiar and Rao 1972, Sen
1983, Oommen 1987, Finance Commission 1988, Coondoo
et al. 2000). Along with the State income, Oommen (1987)
also used its components such as the proportion of income
from agriculture, proportion of income from manufacturing
and proportion of income from hotels, trade and commerce
to explain variation in tax performance. However, due to the
inclusion of the individual components of State income, the
variable for aggregate State income was insignificant (pos-
sibly due to multicollinearity problems) and was later dropped.
Oommen (1987) argued that income from hotels, trade and
commerce would affect the sales tax revenue while income
from manufacturing would affect both the sales and excise
tax revenue. Nambiar and Rao (1972), Sen (1983) and Finance
Commission (1988) also used non-agricultural income and
non-primary sectoral SDP in addition to State income to
explain tax performance. However, these variables are com-
ponents of State income causing multicollinearity problems.14
Sen (1983) also used the percentage of population below
poverty line. Also, Coondoo et al. (2000) used per capita
bank deposits and per capita power consumption of States
in addition to State income. Apart from these variables,
Nambiar and Rao (1972) and Sen (1983) used the degree of
urbanization, Finance Commission (1988) used inequality of
Resource Devolution from the Centre to States: Enhancing the Revenue Capacity of States for Implementation of
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State income was significant, the coefficient of non-primary sectoral SDP was insignificant.
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Coondoo et al. (2000) used the proportion of SC and ST pop-
ulation to explain tax performance across States.
Based on the above studies, our model employs the four
commonly used determinants of taxable capacity namely: per
capita State Domestic Product (SDP), share of manufactur-
ing SDP, headcount measure of poverty and urbanization. Per
capita SDP has been used in almost every study on taxable
capacity. Given the level of per capita SDP, the share of non-
primary sector SDP or manufacturing SDP has been used to
capture the effect of industrialization. The inclusion of poverty
has been primarily to measure income distribution. Urban-
ization has been used to denote the organization of the econ-
omy and the extent of monetized transactions that could be
taxed. While these four indicators were used as explanatory
variables in the model, either the tax-GSDP ratio or per capita
tax has been employed as the dependent variable. Given that
the objective of this exercise is to make future projections of
tax revenue, per capita tax revenue (which gives a better fit
of the model) is used as the dependent variable.15
Of the various capacity variables, after the 1990s, data on
poverty ratio is available only for 1993-94 and 1999-2000.
Further, regression estimates for these years showed that
poverty was highly correlated with GSDP and the share of
manufacturing sector GSDP with total GSDP. Only the GSDP
and urbanization had the highest explanatory power. There-
fore, a pooled model using data for the period 1995-06 to
2002-03 was estimated using State-specific fixed effects.
While GSDP figures were available from the TFC, actual fig-
ures of urbanization were not readily available. However, pro-
jected urbanization estimates of the Registrar General (Cen-
sus of India 1991) were employed to estimate the model.16
The specification of the panel data model including the
cross-section observations for the years 1995-96 to 2002-
03 was as follows:
Per capita tax revenue =  αι + α1 (per capita GSDP)it
+ (urbanization)it + uit
where (α1 = State-specific effect for 
the ith State
As in the OLS model, results in the pooled model including
State-specific fixed effects indicated that both per capita GSDP
and urbanization had a significant effect on per capita tax
revenue (Model 1 in Table 13). The above regression specifi-
cation was further modified keeping in view the first report
of the Ninth Finance Commission, which highlighted that
the slope coefficients of the tax function were homoge-
neous within similar income groups but not across groups.
States were classified into relatively high and low income
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Table 13
Regression results using panel data from 1995-96 to 2002-03
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Per capita GSDP  0.081(20.096)** .087(22.537)** 1.109(18.921)**
Interaction (per capita GSDP* group_dummy) [Au? Pls check] -0.037(-4.893)**
Urbanization 26.948(2.328)* 30.053(2.866)** 0.945(3.696)**
West Bengal -1326.502(-4.415)** -954.297(-3.382)** -7.323(-10.215)**
Uttar Pradesh (including Uttaranchal) -885.430(-3.687)** -648.983(-2.917)** -6.906(-10.348)**
Tamil Nadu -876.039(-2.284)* -1120.289(-3.197)** -6.937(-9.040)**
Rajasthan -979.688(-3.696)** -642.722(-2.577)* -6.937(-10.022)**
Punjab -1241.804(-3.871)** -1505.611(-5.103)** -7.115(-9.602)**
Orissa -765.172(-4.413)** -506.074(-3.058)** -6.692(-10.948)**
Maharashtra -1350.57(-3.082)** -1641.411(-4.096)** -7.283(-9.145)**
Madhya Pradesh (including Chhattisgarh) -999.614(-3.548)** -709.784(-2.713)** -7.000(--9.992)**
Kerala -798.430(-2.641)** -1021.920(-3.686)** -6.789(-9.385)**
Karnataka -892.642(-2.516)* -1117.584(-3.448)** -6.902(-9.188)**
Haryana -907.476(-3.320)** -1146.720(-4.551)** -6.859(-9.641)**
Gujarat -1136.767(-2.915)** -1391.781(-3.904)** -7.107(-9.209)**
Bihar (including Jharkhand) -681.52(-4.206)** -514.970(-3.426)** -6.727(-11.414)**
Assam -744.811(-5.888)** -457.366(-3.556)** -6.569(-11.671)**
Andhra Pradesh -1013.684(-3.193)** -1215.839(-4.192)** -6.990(-9.595)**
F-test for no fixed effects 29.279 13.169 59.398
**Significant at 1% 
*Significant at 5%
15 The source of per capita SDP was CSO, poverty figures from Sen and Himanshu (2004) and urbanization figures from NSSO.
16Analysis of the projected values of urbanization compiled by the Registrar General and the actual census figures of 2001 show that the correlation between the two was about 0.97 and the 
rank correlation is 1.groups and an interaction term of per capita GSDP and the
dummy variable distinguishing the two groups was included
in the regression specification to account for any differences
of slopes between the two groups. The dummy variable assumed
the value of 1 if a State belonged to the lower income group
and zero otherwise. Results indicated that the effect of per
capita GSDP on tax revenue was higher for States with rela-
tively higher income (Model 2 in Table 13). To take into account
the non-linearity in the relationship, the model was re-esti-
mated in the log linear form. The model in the log form was
used for projecting future tax revenues, specifically for the
period 2005-06 to 2009-10 (Model 3 in Table 13). 
The projection of taxable capacity from 2005-06 to 2009-
10 was made by substituting the actual/projected values of
taxable capacity variables in the equation. For the same period,
projections of own tax revenues were also made based on
the past trend from 1993-94 to 2002-03. The higher of the
two estimates was used to indicate the likely generation of
own taxes across States from 2005-06 and 2009-10. It may
be noted that at the past rate, four States-Gujarat, Kerala,
Karnataka and West Bengal-will fall short of the projections
made through the regression model and will have to gener-
ate additional taxes to reach the levels predicted by the model. 
A comparison of these projections with the TFC projections
shows that, in general, the latter are on the higher side (Table
14). In particular, this is true for States for which the require-
ment of resources for health expenditure is particularly high.
Given our objective to estimate the maximum own tax rev-
enues that the States can possibly generate, one may be
hopeful of achieving the higher of the two projections, i.e.
the TFC projections of own taxes. We therefore use the TFC
projections of own tax revenue to calculate the additional own
tax revenues that can be generated in the States from 2005-
06 to 2009-10 (Table 15). It is important to note that States,
which will be unable to meet the committed expenditures in
the projected period, will have to generate additional revenues
to meet their committed liabilities in addition to their rev-
enue generation for health expenditures.
The additional own tax revenues generated in the States
will be distributed across different sectors and therefore can-
not be entirely allocated towards health and health-related
sectors. The National Health Policy 2002 has set a goal of
spending 7% of State budgets to the health sector. Based on
this, we assume that 7% of the additional own tax revenues
generated can be directed towards health. Another 3% of
this additional revenue is assumed to be directed towards
primary schooling. The resources out of additional own tax
revenues that can be allocated towards health and related sec-
tors and the corresponding deficits at 2005-06 prices are
shown in Table 16. As the requirement of resources for roads
deals with the requirements of PMGSY, which is a Centrally
Sponsored scheme, we do not assume any additional alloca-
tion towards roads at the State level. Figures indicate that a
total amount of Rs 38,758 crore can be additionally allo-
cated between 2005-06 and 2009-10 towards health and
related sectors. This is about 13% of total requirement of
resources in the above period. Even if one concentrates on
the requirement of health, water, sanitation and nutrition
alone, the total amount that can be additionally allocated at
the State level is about Rs 31,557 crore. Given the constraints
on resources, if one wishes to focus only on these sectors in
the six States whose per capita additional requirements were
relatively high, viz. Bihar, Assam, Orissa, MP, West Bengal
and UP, the deficit at the State level is around Rs 66,812
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Table 14
Comparison of own tax revenue projections (as percentage of the GSDP)
Present study Twelfth Finance Commission
State 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 2009-10 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 2009-10
Andhra Pradesh 8.0 8.4 8.8 9.2 9.6 8.0 8.1 8.3 8.5 8.6
Assam 5.4 5.6 5.7 5.9 6.0 5.9 6.0 6.1 6.2 6.4
Bihar (including Jharkhand) 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 6.3 6.4 6.5 6.7 6.8
Gujarat 7.6 7.5 7.4 7.3 7.2 7.8 8.1 8.3 8.6 8.9
Haryana 9.4 9.7 9.9 10.2 10.5 9.4 9.6 9.9 10.2 10.4
Karnataka 9.3 9.4 9.5 9.6 9.8 9.9 10.3 10.6 11.0 11.4
Kerala 10.8 11.3 11.8 12.3 12.9 9.5 9.8 10.1 10.4 10.7
MP (including Chhattisgarh) 8.0 8.1 8.2 8.3 8.4 8.1 8.2 8.4 8.6 8.8
Maharashtra 8.2 8.2 8.3 8.3 8.3 8.3 8.6 8.8 9.0 9.3
Orissa 7.1 7.3 7.5 7.7 7.9 7.2 7.4 7.5 7.6 7.8
Punjab 7.6 7.7 7.7 7.7 7.7 8.0 8.3 8.5 8.8 9.1
Rajasthan 7.4 7.4 7.5 7.6 7.6 7.6 7.8 8.0 8.2 8.3
Tamil Nadu 9.8 9.8 9.8 9.7 9.7 10.1 10.3 10.6 10.8 11.1
UP (including Uttaranchal) 6.9 7.0 7.2 7.3 7.4 7.1 7.3 7.5 7.6 7.8
West Bengal 4.8 4.9 5.0 5.1 5.1 5.8 6.0 6.2 6.5 6.8
Note: Projections of GSDP have been made using the prescriptive growth rates suggested by the Twelfth Finance Commissioncrore (Table 17).  
The States of Bihar, Assam, Orissa, UP and MP not only
have a high requirement of health expenditures, but also have
a relatively low capability of generating additional revenues
and therefore have a high deficit. Possibly recognizing this, the
TFC has provided additional grants for health expenditures
specifically to the States of Assam, Bihar, Jharkhand, MP, Orissa,
UP and Uttaranchal to equalize the health expenditures within
the special and non-special category States. The TFC has also
allocated additional grants for equalizing education expen-
ditures to the States of Assam, Bihar, Jharkhand, MP, Orissa,
Rajasthan, UP and West Bengal. The total grant under these
two heads at 2005-06 prices is about Rs 13,927 crore. The
State-wise grants and the deficit even after the TFC grants for
health and education are shown in Table 18. 
It must be noted that the release of additional grants from
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Table 15
Additional own tax revenue projections 
As percentage of the GSDP At current prices (Rs in crore)
State 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 2009-10 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 2009-10
Andhra Pradesh 0.70 0.80 1.00 1.20 1.30 1712 2172 3013 4014 4,827
Assam 1.39 1.49 1.59 1.69 1.89 738 878 1040 1227 1,523
Bihar (including Jharkhand) 1.83 1.93 2.03 2.23 2.33 2330 2728 3185 3884 4,504
Gujarat 0.42 0.72 0.92 1.22 1.52 749 1448 2087 3122 4,388
Haryana 1.01 1.21 1.51 1.81 2.01 910 1221 1706 2291 2,849
Karnataka 1.39 1.79 2.09 2.49 2.89 2438 3542 4665 6269 8,207
Kerala 1.57 1.87 2.17 2.47 2.77 1836 2427 3126 3949 4,916
MP (including Chhattisgarh) 2.37 2.47 2.67 2.87 3.07 3664 4266 5152 6188 7,396
Maharashtra 0.58 0.88 1.08 1.28 1.58 2312 3929 5401 7169 9,911
Orissa 1.62 1.82 1.92 2.02 2.22 979 1221 1430 1670 2,037
Punjab 1.35 1.65 1.85 2.15 2.45 1383 1876 2335 3012 3,809
Rajasthan 1.37 1.57 1.77 1.97 2.07 1710 2211 2811 3529 4,183
Tamil Nadu 1.13 1.33 1.63 1.83 2.13 2333 3098 4283 5424 7,121
UP (including Uttaranchal) 1.62 1.82 2.02 2.12 2.32 4780 6011 7467 8772 10,744
West Bengal 1.54 1.74 1.94 2.24 2.54 3845 4900 6163 8027 10,267
Note: Projections of GSDP have been made using the prescriptive growth rates suggested by the Twelfth Finance Commission
Table 16
Additional revenues that can be directed towards health and related sectors (Rs in crore) at current prices 
Total (through 5% reallocation and directing part of 
From additional tax revenues the additional own tax revenues)
State 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 2009-10 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 2009-10
Andhra Pradesh 171.2 217.2 301.3 401.4 482.7 660 814 994 1238 1485
Assam 73.8 87.8 104 122.7 152.3 74 88 104 123 152
Bihar (including Jharkhand) 233 272.8 318.5 388.4 450.4 233 273 319 388 450
Gujarat 74.9 144.8 208.7 312.2 438.8 735 889 1071 1285 1536
Haryana 91 122.1 170.6 229.1 284.9 208 253 318 394 469
Karnataka 243.8 354.2 466.5 626.9 820.7 560 710 868 1080 1332
Kerala 183.6 242.7 312.6 394.9 491.6 207 282 356 459 563
MP (including Chhattisgarh) 366.4 426.6 515.2 618.8 739.6 676 737 843 964 1077
Maharashtra 231.2 392.9 540.1 716.9 991.1 391 527 640 829 1054
Orissa 97.9 122.1 143 167 203.7 98 122 143 167 204
Punjab 138.3 187.6 233.5 301.2 380.9 138 188 234 301 381
Rajasthan 171 221.1 281.1 352.9 418.3 208 263 329 389 459
Tamil Nadu 233.3 309.8 428.3 542.4 712.1 481 589 717 868 1080
UP (including Uttaranchal) 478 601.1 746.7 877.2 1074.4 773 964 1190 1374 1676
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Table 17
State-wise deficit of resources in health and related sectors, 2005-06 to 2009-10 (Rs in crore) 
at 2005-06 prices
State Total Health*
Requirement Additional allocation Deficit Requirement Additional allocation Deficit
Andhra Pradesh 6,155 4,433 1,722 944 4,033 0
Assam 9,776 463 9,313 3,704 324 3,380
Bihar (including Jharkhand) 50,935 1,427 49,508 19,251 999 18,252
Gujarat 27,364 4,721 22,643 2,613 4,426 0
Haryana 1,344 1,401 0 1,290 1,174 116
Karnataka 1,617 3,879 0 1,128 3,243 0
Kerala 4,519 1,585 2,934 4,442 1,171 3,271
MP (including Chhattisgarh) 51,572 3,710 47,862 12,190 3,024 9,166
Maharashtra 7,212 2,923 4,289 5,149 2,199 2,950
Orissa 21,095 629 20,466 6,024 440 5,584
Punjab 4,477 1,054 3,423 1,355 738 617
Rajasthan 15,572 1,409 14,163 5,166 1,040 4,126
Tamil Nadu 1,467 3,191 0 612 2,626 0
UP (including Uttaranchal) 66,352 5,114 61,238 28,111 4,146 23,965
West Bengal 30,734 2,819 27,915 8,438 1,973 6,465
300,188 38,758 261,430 100,417 31,557 77,892
*Includes, health, water, sanitation and nutrition
Table 18
Additional (conditional equalization) grants provided to individual States for meeting health and
education expenditures by the Twelfth Finance Commission (TFC) and the deficit after using the TFC grant
(Rs in crore) 2005-06 prices
State Deficit before TFC  Deficit before Health Education Total Deficit after Deficit after 
transfer for health* TFC transfer   TFC transfer TFC transfer
(Total) for health (Total)
Andhra Pradesh 0 1,722 0 0 0 0 1,722
Assam 3,380 9,313 829 960 1,789 2,551 7,524
Bihar (including Jharkhand) 18,252 49,508 1881 2891 4,772 16,371 44,736
Gujarat 0 22,643 0 0 0 0 22,643
Haryana 116 0 0 0 0 116 0
Karnataka 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Kerala 3,271 2,934 0 0 0 3,271 2,934
MP (including Chhattisgarh) 9,166 47,862 169 398 567 8,997 47,295
Maharashtra 2,950 4,289 0 0 0 2,950 4,289
Orissa 5,584 20,466 163 280 443 5,421 20,023
Punjab 617 3,423 0 0 0 617 3423
Rajasthan 4,126 14,163 0 88 88 4,126 14,075
Tamil Nadu 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
UP (including Uttaranchal) 23,965 61,238 2068 3861 5,928 21,897 55,310
West Bengal 6,465 27,915 0 340 340 6,465 27,575
Total 77,892 261,430 5110 8818 13,927 72,782 247,503
*Includes, health water, sanitation and nutrition the TFC has been tied to various conditions. In general, the
release of grants for health and education has been made con-
ditional on States’ meeting the Commission’s projections for
non-plan revenue expenditure (NPRE) on health and educa-
tion. Given that these projections of NPRE is higher than what
would be achieved if the past growth rate of NPRE on these
sectors continued, fiscally stressed States may find it diffi-
cult to actually access these grants. 
Even if one assumes that the concerned States will be able
to access the TFC grants, there is still a substantial amount
of deficit in the requirement of resources for meeting health
goals (Table 18). These additional resources have to be met
by other Central transfers. The next section discusses the nature
of Central transfers that would be required and the norms that
should be followed for Central transfers to States for meet-
ing the resource gap.
Central transfers to States 
The above analysis shows that State Governments will have
to augment considerable resources through better tax effort
and release more resources for the social sectors through
better fiscal management and reprioritization. Even so, this
can meet the requirements only partially and significant addi-
tional resources will have to be committed to health and allied
sectors. Thus, achievement of the MDGs as well as the Tenth
Plan Goals in the health sector will crucially depend on addi-
tional resources made available through the transfer system
and better targeting of these transfers.
Central transfers to States fall into three categories. The first
is the statutory transfers comprising tax devolution and grants,
which are given on the basis of the recommendations of the
Finance Commission. The second is the plan assistance given
by the Planning Commission on the basis of the consensus
formula approved by the National Development Council (NDC).
The third source is the transfer given by various Central min-
istries for the Central sector and Centrally sponsored schemes. 
Analytically, transfers can be given for general purposes, to
offset the general fiscal disabilities of the States, or for spe-
cific purposes. While the former is given to enable every
State to provide a given level of public services at a given tax
price, the latter is given to ensure minimum standards of spec-
ified services. The latter are given as these services are con-
sidered to be meritorious and, therefore, everyone is entitled
to a minimum level of their consumption. These transfers are
targeted to spend on specified purposes/sectors and they have
to be targeted to those States with shortfalls. 
The statutory and formula-based transfers of the Planning
Commission are essentially general-purpose transfers. These
are meant to offset the general fiscal disabilities of States aris-
ing from the low revenue-raising capacity or higher unit cost
of providing public services. These are formula-based trans-
fers meant for general augmentation of resources and can-
not be pre-empted for spending on health and allied sectors.
The important exception to this is the upgradation grants
for health and education recommended by the TFC. As dis-
cussed in the previous section, while these are useful supple-
ments, they would be inadequate to meet the requirements
for achieving the set goals. 
Besides being general-purpose transfers, it is doubtful whether
the Centre would be able to augment them much to bridge
the gap in States’ resources.for the health sector for at least
two reasons. First, given the compulsions of restoring fiscal
balance at the Central level itself and given further the com-
pulsions of meeting the fiscal targets set by the Fiscal Respon-
sibility and Budget Management Act, it would be difficult
for the Centre to make additional resources available for
general purpose spending. Second, the TFC has already made
recommendations with marginally increased transfers from
the last Commission and these recommendations will be
valid during 2005-06 to 2009-10. Under this no additional
resources would be available. 
This would imply that any increase in the transfers will
have to be for specific purposes under the Central sector and
Centrally sponsored schemes. At present, a large number of
schemes are being administered by various ministries result-
ing in the thin spread of resources, multiplication of bureau-
cracy and often, poor targeting. To meet the shortfalls in the
health sector, it is necessary to significantly augment spe-
cific transfers to enhance the resources for health spending.
In addition, it would be necessary to consolidate various
schemes under the broad heads of basic education, health-
care, mother and child, nutrition, water supply and sanita-
tion and rural roads. This will target the transfers to augment
spending in desired sectors. 
Equally important is proper designing of the transfer sys-
tem. It is useful to have purpose-specific grants. To have the
system with right incentives and to ensure that the additional
resources provided by the Centre are used for incremental
spending and not merely to substitute States’ own spending,
it is useful to mandate the States to make matching contri-
butions. Requiring the States’ additional contribution will help
to reprioritize States’ own spending in favour of health and
allied sectors and impart a sense of participation and owner-
ship by them in the task of augmenting health services. Of
course, matching requirement places poorer and resource con-
strained States at a disadvantage, but the matching require-
ment itself can be varied with the level of per capita incomes
in the States (Feldstein 1975). Thus, high-income States may
be required to contribute say, 50%, middle-income States 30%
and low-income States a mere 10%. Such a design of the trans-
fer system for specific purposes will preserve the incentives,
impart a sense of ownership and participation by the States
and help to augment resources for the desired sectors. 
Conclusion 
This study analyses the resource requirements for meeting cer-
tain targets of the health sector and analyses the gap between
the required and the actual expenditure in 15 major States in
India. It highlights the extent of resources that can be mobi-
lized at the State level to meet the resource gap and estimates
the residual gap that has to be met by Central transfers. 
Estimates indicate that the additional expenditure required
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sectors (which include safe drinking water, sanitation, nutri-
tion, primary schooling and roads) is about Rs 300,168 crore.
One can argue that the expenditure on primary schooling and
roads has various other positive externalities and are not exclu-
sively incurred towards health. Although, not exclusively
towards health, these expenditures have a significant bear-
ing towards health outcomes and cannot be ignored if one
has to reach the health targets. Even if one focuses only on
medical, public health, safe drinking water and sanitation,
which are directly incurred towards health outcomes, the total
requirement is about Rs 100,415 crore. In general, there is a
deficit of about Rs 247,503 crore at the State level. The require-
ments are particularly high in States with low per capita income
and high poverty levels. These are also the States where the
productivity of expenditure and delivery of services are par-
ticularly poor. If one is constrained on the resource front, these
aspects have to be specifically focused upon. Improving the
productivity of expenditure and delivery systems in these low-
income States can actually reduce the resource requirement.
However, it would be too optimistic to expect any appre-
ciable improvement in the productivity of healthcare expen-
diture in the near future. In particular, it may be noted that
the level of productivity and delivery systems are often affected
by a number of social, cultural and historical factors which
change slowly over time. These improvements therefore can-
not act as a substitute for increased allocation of funds in
the short run. One therefore has to find resources to make
increased allocation to healthcare expenditure in the next five
to ten years. 
Increased allocation to healthcare expenditure can be done
by (i) raising more resources; (ii) reprioritizing the expendi-
ture allocation in favour of medical and public health, water
supply and sanitation; and (iii) targeting the expenditures to
States and regions where the health indicators are poor and
have considerable catching up to do. 
The possibility of raising additional resources has been dis-
cussed at length. We have compared our estimates of tax-
able capacity with the estimates made by the TFC. The abil-
ity of the States to contribute additional resources to the
health sector critically depends on their effort in raising rev-
enues close to their capacity. In this context, two points are
important. First, our estimates show that there is a possibil-
ity of raising revenues, particularly in some States where the
actual revenues raised are below their capacity. Second, the
capacity estimation itself is relative to other States and not
in the absolute sense. In other words, if there is a general
undertaxation by all States, it does not show up in the esti-
mates. For example, although the States have been assigned
the power to levy tax on agricultural income and wealth,
they have mainly for political reasons desisted from this and
even the land revenue collections have declined over the years.
It is certainly possible to raise the bar through better tax admin-
istration. 
The most important initiative in this regard is the intro-
duction of value added tax (VAT) by most States with effect
from 1 April 2005. Although this is expected to be revenue
neutral, it is expected to increase the revenue productivity of
the tax system in the long term. The extension of the tax net
to the retail stage would broaden the base and is expected to
more than offset the loss of tax base due to giving credit to
inputs. More importantly, the self-enforcing nature of the tax
is expected to significantly improve the tax compliance and
this could improve revenue productivity. Thus, it should not
be difficult to improve the revenues by at least by 1%-1.5%
of the GSDP over the next five years.
The second way to release more resources to the health sec-
tor is to reprioritize the expenditure in favour of the sector. In
this context, it is important to restrict expenditure to contain
revenue deficits as would be required under the Fiscal Respon-
sibility Act (FRA) by each State mandated by the TFC. How-
ever, reprioritization should happen in the process of con-
taining the expenditure on wages and salaries as a ratio of total
revenue expenditure to the levels that prevailed in 1996-97
as suggested by the TFC. Much of the reduction in the wages
and salaries expenditure should happen in administrative depart-
ments and not in the education and health sector. In fact, in
the latter, it is important to ensure that CHCs, PHCs and sub-
centres are properly staffed to provide the service and ensure
health outcomes. It is important to restructure the adminis-
tration and reduce the wages and salaries by freezing employ-
ment in administrative departments. The debt rescheduling
and reduction in interest rates recommended by the TFC would
allow additional fiscal space to the States. Besides, the TFC has
recommended incentive-based debt write off to the tune of
Rs 32,198 crore over the same period when the States reduce
their revenue deficits as per the targets set out in the FRA. It
is important that the additional fiscal space created by these
recommendations is used for human development. 
Another important strategy to be adopted to improve the
effectiveness of health expenditure is to target the allocations
to States where the health outcomes are poor. It is precisely
for this reason that the TFC has recommended equalizing
grants to those States with less than average per capita expen-
ditures within the revenue account. Although the TFC’s equal-
ization does not entirely cover the shortfall in per capita expen-
ditures, this type of targeting expenditures could help to
improve the health outcomes precisely in States with large
shortfalls from the norms.
The recommendations of the TFC, however, can cover only
a partial requirement of the States. Achieving the MDGs and
the Tenth Plan targets would require significant additional
resources and improved productivity in spending to focus on
outcomes rather than outlays. Much of the intervention in
this area will have to come by way of consolidation of a plethora
of Central schemes prevailing at present, and augmentation
of specific purpose transfers for broadly defined purposes.
This paper argues that the appropriate design for targeting,
preserving the incentives and to ensure participatory provi-
sion is to have a specific purpose transfer with matching
contributions from the States, the latter varying with the
level of their development. 
From the above discussion, it would be reasonable to sum-
marize that significant additional allocation to health sector is
NCMH Background Papers-Health Systems in India: Delivery and Financing of Services 275
Resource Devolution from the Centre to States: Enhancing the Revenue Capacity of States for Implementation ofwithin the realm of possibility. This, however, would require
that States should exercise prudent fiscal management. They
should also be clear in their assignment of priority. Investment
in human capital is critical to both accelerating growth, enhance
productivity and empowering the poor. Improving the health
status of population is a critical component of human devel-
opment and the States will have to reassign their priorities in
favour of the health sector in the interest of development.
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